Due Process

Evidence began this week in the trial of Dr. Conrad Murray, the embattled former personal physician for pop icon, Michael Jackson. Jackson died from an overdose of an anesthetic, propofol, prescribed by Murray. What is not in dispute is that Murray had been administering propofol to Jackson to treat his chronic insomnia. What is disputed is whether it was medically appropriate to administer a drug normally intended for a hospital operating room. In his opening statement, lead prosecutor referred to Murray’s actions as not comporting with the applicable medical standards of care.

In medical malpractice actions a claimant has the burden to prove that a doctor deviated from accepted medical standards of care. Such a deviation that causes injury is the basis for a malpractice damages award. But the question posed in this case is whether the basis for civil tort liability should also expose a doctor to criminal penalties. Malpractice claims for wrongful death are not uncommon in our courts. Manslaughter prosecutions for standard of care deviations are extremely unique, but not unheard of.

In February of this year Dr. Roberto Bonilla was convicted in a Los Angeles courtroom of manslaughter for the death of a 33 year old man during attempted gall bladder surgery preformed in a home based health clinic. Rather than admit the patient to a hospital and perform the surgery under general anesthesia, Bonilla administered the local anesthetic, lidocaine, in such a dose that the patient immediately went into cardiac arrest and succumbed. The physician was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, the very charge that Murray faces. For his wrong, Bonilla received 6 months in jail (to be served over 30 consecutive weekends) and five years probation.

Under California law involuntary manslaughter is a lesser form of homicide. Unlike murder, which generally requires an intent to kill, involuntary manslaughter can occur without such a guilty intent. In that state it is defined as an unlawful killing that takes place during the commission of an unlawful act (not amounting to a felony), or during the commission of a lawful act which involves a high risk of death or great bodily harm that is committed without due caution or circumspection. The charging document in Murray’s case alleges that Murray acted without malice and killed Jackson in the manner described in the statute.

Every felony requires proof of some form of state of mind. Acts are either intentional, reckless or criminally negligent. In the case of involuntary manslaughter the very name describes the mental state required. The actor is not alleged to have intended death. In our state the equivalent charge would be Manslaughter in the Second Degree, a Class C felony punishable up to 10 years in prison: “Sec. 53a-56. (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when: (1) He recklessly causes the death of another person . . . .” Recklessness requires proof that the actor was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death. “The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”

Here, more than a deviation from accepted medical standards of care would be needed. In a malpractice case that deviation is proven by showing that it departed from what a reasonably prudent similar practitioner would do under the same or similar circumstances. This is a clear distinction from the “gross deviation” and conscious disregard needed to prove criminal responsibility

Trial lawyers are like directors of live TV or theater productions. When a case is finally reached for trial there are a number of tasks to be completed to set the stage for the final presentation. Civil jury cases have a definite shelf life in Connecticut, having already gone through a number of stages. Depending on the complexity of the issues and the Judicial District in which the case is pending, from inception of suit to the first day of trial can take 1-4 years. In recent years our judges have endeavored to shorten that time span.

Once discovery is complete and all relevant depositions of fact witnesses and experts have been accomplished the lawyer’s task is to start to collate vast amounts of information, catalog those diffuse facts and begin to assemble the theme of the case. In the past cases were placed on a printed trial list. Periodically, the presiding judge would publish the list and have a jury call. Lawyers would attend this cattle call and inform the court whether a case was ready for trial or needed reassignment. The lawyer had to monitor the progress of prior “ready” cases on the list to gauge when a case was going to be called in to start.

In complex cases, requiring expert testimony, this system was a nightmare. It was difficult to project when the case would actually commence and thus lining up experts was constantly problematic. In recent years, the courts have gone to definite assignment dates. Lawyers confer with each other in a court mandated scheduling conference and agree to a schedule for completion of discovery and dates for trial. When your date arrives you have to be ready.

So what does that entail for the busy trial lawyer with a stable of cases? First, it requires an experienced support staff to keep us to the schedule. Due dates have to be calendared and care taken to make sure that the other side has received all prospective exhibits and expert opinions. Prior to the actual trial date the court sets a Trial Management Conference. Attendance is mandatory, coupled with a Trial Management Report (TMR). The Judicial Department website provides the format for the TMR (http://jud.ct.gov/external/super/Standorders/Civil/TMC_Order_Court.pdf).

Preparing the TMR is a useful organizational tool for counsel and support staff. First, the court requires all sides cooperate in the preparation of the report. It begins with a simple, non-argumentative statement of the issues in the case which the presiding judge will read at the inception of jury selection. It must include the names and proposed order of presentation of ALL trial witnesses. Failure to include a witness on the list will lead to the witness’s exclusion.

All proposed trial exhibits must be identified and pre-marked with appropriate plaintiff or defendant exhibit stickers. Counsel have to indicate whether there will be objections to particular exhibits and the basis, as well as whether there are outstanding legal issues. Typically, when lawyers anticipate a battle about the admission of an exhibit or testimony they will prepare a Motion in Limine which seeks a ruling from the court before the evidence is actually proffered. This allows the judge the chance to research the issue and thus minimize the chance for an erroneous ruling.

While forcing the trial lawyer to be organized in advance, the TMR and the resulting Trial Management Conference allow for the seamless presentation of evidence. When done correctly they minimize the intrusion that a trial is in the lives of jurors and save lawyers from developing ulcers. Cooperation among adversaries lets the court and jury focus on the real issues. To insure compliance courts will sanction offending lawyers. The more egregious the breach, the deeper into that lawyer’s checkbook a judge will go, sometimes ordering the payment of thousands of dollars to the other side. The lesson for counsel is be prepared and get it right!

In 1966 the U. S. Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona, acknowledging that a person in police custody may not be interrogated without being warned of certain of his 5th and 6th Amendment rights. Principally, those rights are the right to remain silent; to be informed that anything said will be used against him; that he is entitled to an attorney and if he cannot afford an attorney one will be provided for him; and last, if he does decide to answer questions he can stop at any time. In the decades since there have been a myriad number of decisions by appellate courts on all levels further clarifying or distinguishing instances where the so-called Miranda warnings are needed (not advice about how to dance the Meringue with Carmen Miranda).

The linchpin of Miranda is the existence of custodial interrogation. Thus, if a person is detained, but under circumstances where he is free to leave, the courts have uniformly permitted the admission of inculpatory statements made in the absence of the Miranda warnings. What constitutes “custody” and what constitutes “interrogation” have prompted numerous appeals. The real teeth to Miranda, however, is not the warning requirement but the remedy for a violation of those rights. That remedy is suppression or exclusion of the damning statements.

At trial a defendant has the right to challenge the admission of such statements by filing a Motion to Suppress Evidence. The trial judge will conduct an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury to elicit facts necessary to determine if the there has been a Miranda violation. If found the court then invokes what is known as the Exclusionary Rule (announced in Mapp v Ohio in 1961), prohibiting the use of the illegally obtained statements in evidence.

This week our state Supreme Court reviewed a ruling by a trial judge in Stamford and ordered a new trial for Harry Gonzalez. Gonzalez had been convicted of felony murder and robbery in the first degree in the brutal slaying of a 75 year-old woman in her home. The trial judge had been persuaded that the Miranda warnings were not given in a timely fashion and had excluded some statements by Gonzalez but segmented the police interview and determined that other statements could be admitted. Gonzalez did not confess to the crime; rather, he admitted knowledge of the deceased and that he had been at her home. At the core was whether the accused was being interrogated and whether his invocation of his right to an attorney had been artfully overborne by the investigating officers.

This is the type of decision that sparks outrage at our courts. Staunch law and order supporters view such rulings as handcuffing police and allowing guilty people freedom on legal loopholes. That is not the case here. First, you should understand that in keeping with its staid, conservative Yankee tradition, our appellate courts rarely reverse convictions, particularly where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming. Our judges will strive to uphold jury verdicts unless the legal errors are substantial and harmful. In the Gonzalez case the police did violate his Miranda rights. But the inquiry did not end there. It was necessary for the Court to determine whether the error by the trial judge in failing to suppress the statements was harmful; that is, did it unfairly impact the result in this case. The Court examined the balance of the prosecution’s case and concluded that the evidence, exclusive of the tainted statements, would not support the conviction. The balance of the state’s proof depended on testimony from a turn-coat “accomplice” who had a history of drug abuse and criminal convictions. Two other witnesses offered by the state gave descriptions of the assailant that did not match the defendant.

The Court did not open the jail doors and free Gonzalez. Instead it remanded the case for a new trial without the illegally obtained statements. The remedy for the Stamford Police in the future is simple: if you want to avoid this type of result pay careful heed to the rules or your efforts will be undone.

Rich Meehan is a nationally certified civil and criminal trial specialist and a Fellow of the International Academy of Trial Lawyers. Rich is the senior partner in the law firm of Meehan, Meehan & Gavin, LLP, Bridgeport, Conn. For more information on Rich or his firm go to www.meehanlaw.com or www.ctdentalmalpracticelawyer.com, or e-mail Rich at rtm@meehanlaw.com

In criminal jury trials jurors may rely on two types of evidence: direct and circumstantial. Circumstantial evidence allows a factual conclusion to be reached based on inferences built from other indirect facts. Direct evidence, by contrast, is direct proof of a fact, usually based upon testimony from a witness as to what that person saw or heard or did. There are no inferences or presumptions that aid this proof, and if believed it is damning evidence.

The traditional example of direct evidence is the account of an eyewitness. To the uninitiated, it will generally appear that eyewitness testimony is the most reliable. After all, a witness takes an oath to tell the truth and then recounts in detail his recollection. That recollection is then forced to withstand the crucible of cross examination. Witnesses often recount in graphic detail what they recall from an event. Many times there are additional facts that serve to corroborate the witness’ recollection. In “whodunit” type cases the identification of the accused as the perpetrator is the central issue for the jury to resolve. Eyewitness testimony accounts for the overwhelming percentage of evidence of an identification. Where that testimony is corroborated by other facts, such as fingerprints or DNA, the result is a conviction that will generally withstand appellate review.

But what of the cases where the only evidence to tie an accused to a crime is the recollection of one eyewitness? Is that sufficient and is it reliable? These are questions that have been repeatedly debated in our jurisprudence. There is a traditional jury instruction given in criminal cases in Connecticut, jurors are told they: “. . . should take into account whether the witness had adequate opportunity and ability to observe the perpetrator on the date in question. This will be affected by such considerations as the length of time available to make the observation; the distance between the witness and the perpetrator; the lighting conditions at the time of the offense; whether the witness had known or seen the person in the past; the history, if any, between them, including any degree of animosity; and whether anything distracted the attention of the witness during the incident. You should also consider the witness’s physical and emotional condition at the time of the incident, and the witness’s powers of observation in general.”

In cases where the witness’ recollection is uncertain, unclear or inconsistent the court must inform the jury that there are dangers inherent in eyewitness identification. The failure of a judge to give these special instructions will lead to a reversal on appeal. Defense lawyers and social scientists have argued that these same dangers should be discussed in all disputed identification cases, even when the witness is adamant. Courts have consistently rejected these arguments, until now. Recently the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a landmark decision which will resonate nationally, State v. Henderson, has ruled that, “[t]he current legal standard for assessing eyewitness identification evidence must be revised because it does not offer an adequate measure for reliability; does not sufficiently deter inappropriate police conduct; and overstates the jury’s ability to evaluate identification evidence.” This court acknowledged the vast amount of modern research on the frailties of human memory, noting that misidentification has accounted for the vast percentage of wrongful convictions that have been overturned based on newly utilized DNA evidence. One author reports that of the 273 exonerations obtained by the Innocence Project, 3 out of 4 were based on eyewitness identifications, a chilling statistic.

In November the U. S. Supreme Court will reconsider the standard that emerged in 1977 from its seminal case of Manson v. Brathwaite, a Connecticut conviction based on a challenged police identification procedure. Social science, which was once roundly rejected by trial courts, will now play a decisive role in the resolution of this troubling issue.

Rich Meehan is a nationally certified civil and criminal trial specialist and a Fellow of the International Academy of Trial Lawyers. Rich is the senior partner in the law firm of Meehan, Meehan & Gavin, LLP, Bridgeport, Conn. For more information on Rich or his firm go to www.meehanlaw.com or www.ctdentalmalpracticelawyer.com, or e-mail Rich at rtm@meehanlaw.com

September has always been a defining month for major league baseball. Rosters expand from 25 to 40 as teams either begin their tuneups for the ensuing playoffs or expose their youngsters to the big league, looking to the future. September was also the month that Roger Clemens would focus on another World Series ring or the Cy Young chase.

This September the Rocket isn’t unleashing his devastating fastball. This is the month that will define not only his baseball legacy but also his liberty. On September 2nd a federal judge will entertain arguments on the issue of whether the Government gets another chance to put the Rocket in a different set of pinstripes, those of a federal prisoner.

Clemens dodged a high, hard inside pitch by the Government when the prosecution, either from an over-zealous abuse of the rules or just plain stupidity, displayed a portion of a video to the Clemens trial jury that had been previously ruled out of the case by the judge. In their recent filing the Government called it inadvertent and the result of being over-burdened by the remainder of their trial preparation. From a trial lawyer’s perspective, this is not a simple, honest mistake. Trial Practice 101 teaches law students that you should always fully review any potential trial exhibit. It’s hard to accept that the prohibited portion of this video was inadvertently included.

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from twice exposing a citizen to a loss of liberty. The classic example is the person acquitted of a crime, arrested once again and forced to endure a second trial. The Clause requires the Government to take their best shot once, and only once.

In a lesser-known situation, multiple charges that seek to punish what is essentially a single crime by multiple counts is not allowed. For example, take someone who is accused of the crime of possession of narcotics and who has both cocaine and heroin. The state cannot charge separate counts with separate penalties for possession of each substance. The crime is possession of narcotics no matter how many different types of narcotics are possessed.

Within a single prosecution some instances of double jeopardy, claimed for multiple charges arising from the same incident, are cured by the imposition of concurrent jail terms rather than those terms running consecutively. The Clause may allow the multiple convictions but not permit piling on the penalties, because it protects liberty. Different as well is the declaration of a mistrial because a jury is unable to reach a verdict. There is a manifest necessity that justifies the mistrial but jeopardy does not attach and a retrial most often results in convictions with no Fifth Amendment violation.

This mistrial situation is not as clearly defined as in the instance of a prior acquittal. The issue whether jeopardy attaches clearly focuses on the Government’s intention. The standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court is set forth in the 1982 decision, Oregon v. Kennedy: “The general rule is said to be that the double jeopardy clause does not bar reprosecution, ‘. . . where circumstances develop not attributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, . . . even if defendant’s motion is necessitated by a prosecutorial error.’ . . . However, retrial is barred where the error that prompted the mistrial is intended to provoke a mistrial or is ‘motivated by bad faith or undertaken to harass or prejudice’ the defendant.”

When a pitcher is ejected for throwing at a batter’s head, the umpire has to determine the intent of the pitch. On September 2nd we will learn whether the Government gets ejected like the head hunting pitcher.

Rich Meehan is a nationally certified civil and criminal trial specialist and a Fellow of the International Academy of Trial Lawyers. Rich is the senior partner in the law firm of Meehan, Meehan & Gavin, LLP, Bridgeport, Conn. For more information on Rich or his firm go to www.meehanlaw.com or www.ctdentalmalpracticelawyer.com, or e-mail Rich at rtm@meehanlaw.com

Since the mid 19th century laws attempting to regulate, tax and finally criminalize marijuana use proliferated. The 1936 classic, Reefer Madness, painted the grim picture for parents of the evils of marijuana use. Decades of criminal prosecutions followed as the drug flourished in the 1960′s and ’70′s on college campuses. Youngsters found with small amounts of the drug in their possession found themselves labeled as criminals.

I recall as a young lawyer representing defendants charged with marijuana possession who had trace amounts of the substance, sometimes nothing more than some seeds, in their possession. The law in this state punishes possession of even trace amounts of drugs. In some instances, the amount was so small that it was fully consumed in the testing process in the state labs.

How many teens and young college students lost job opportunities because they were labeled as criminals when they were caught with small amounts of marijuana in their possession? In addition, prosecutions of small quantities of the drug placed a substantial burden on police and the court system. Seeing this, our legislature has now “decriminalized” possession of small amounts of marijuana as of July 1st of this year. Not that possession is now legal; rather, possession of less than one-half ounce of the drug is now an infraction punishable by a fine. No longer is that person labeled a criminal. The effect of a “conviction” for possession is no more serious than a traffic offense.

Subsequent offenses lead to escalating penalties. The sale or possession with the intent to sell is still a serious crime. To illustrate, a youngster is pulled over by a police officer who notices an odor of burnt marijuana. The cop searches the vehicle and finds a single plastic bag with one-third of an ounce of pot. The kid is issued a summons, goes to court and pays his fine with no criminal conviction record. Take that same kid and put the marijuana in a number of small glassine bags or vials, or add some type of scale that weighs in grams and the kid is now arrested for the felony of possession with intent to sell the drug, punishable by seven years imprisonment. The multitude of small baggies or a scale are viewed as indicia of the intent to sell the drug. Put that same car within 1500′ of a school yard and that same kid is also facing a mandatory three year prison sentence.

There was a certain amount of hypocrisy in the manner in which some cases were handled. I knew of one prosecutor who used to grow the plants in his attic while in school but insisted on jail for mere possession back in the late ’70′s. The new laws have changed all that for the future. But what about that legion of people who were either saddled with a criminal record or forced to utilize one-time only pre-trial diversionary programs to avoid conviction?

The legislature needs to go one more step. There should be an amnesty program for those whose convictions were based on possession that is now no longer criminal. There is a vehicle in our law that would facilitate this. These individuals should be granted full pardons by the State Board of Pardons and Parole upon a showing of the amount they possessed as reflected in the police reports from their convictions. This is not to condone use of the drug; rather, it is a point of fundamental fairness. If the possession of small amounts for personal consumption is no longer criminal then it never should have been in the first instance. Hopefully the legislature will recognize this injustice and restore clean records to those unlucky enough to have had their flirtation with the drug at an earlier age.

Rich Meehan is a nationally certified civil and criminal trial specialist and a Fellow of the International Academy of Trial Lawyers. Rich is the senior partner in the law firm of Meehan, Meehan & Gavin, LLP, Bridgeport, Conn. For more information on Rich or his firm go to www.meehanlaw.com or www.ctdentalmalpracticelawyer.com, or e-mail Rich at rtm@meehanlaw.com

Last week I had the privilege of being inducted as a Fellow of the International Academy of Trial Lawyers. Membership is by invitation only and is limited to 500 trial lawyers in the U.S. and a distinguished group of practitioners in 30 other countries. The vetting process is extensive. Candidates are asked to submit a list of cases tried before a court or jury with names of opponents and judges. The candidate is not informed of the reason for the request for this exhaustive list only that he or she is being considered for a particular honor. A committee then contacts each of the lawyers and judges on the list for a confidential evaluation. Only after passing that gauntlet was I informed of my selection. I don’t share this to brag, although it was one of the proudest moments of my career; rather, I submit it to you with a simple question: if you were in an accident or about to be charged with a serious crime how would you select a lawyer?

In 1977, the United States Supreme Court, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, changed the legal landscape in a landmark decision permitting attorneys to advertise. Up until that time ethical constraints prohibited lawyer ads. Ours was a profession that honored dignity and reputation. Bates changed all of that. Prior to that time when you needed a lawyer with special expertise you called the family lawyer or solicited names from friends or colleagues. Lawyers flourished in this “word of mouth” world on reputations earned in the courtroom and not based on the size of an artful advertising budget.

So how would you find a lawyer if you or a family member suffered a devastating injury? Better yet, how would you select an orthopedic surgeon or neurologist? Would you run outside and grab a phone number off the closest bus or taxi? Would you look for the nearest billboard or tune into a late night infomercial for one of those incessant TV ads? Of course not. So then why do so many people rely on such ads to select someone to champion them in one of the most stressful matters in their lives?

When the Supreme Court took the shackles off attorney advertising the belief was that consumers and the market place would benefit. Restrictions on lawyer advertising were painted as an unconstitutional commercial restraint on the First Amendment’s freedom of speech.

Has it really benefited you, the consumer? Do those glitzy ads or someone’s face plastered over the windows and side of the local bus really speak to any expertise? Rather consumers become lemmings, following the crowd. Name and face recognition from advertising gives a false sense of expertise. The Statewide Grievance Committee does require us to submit any advertisements or website URL’s for quarterly examination.

There are rules on what you may say about your skills. For example, only lawyers who are certified as specialists by accredited organizations may list themselves as such. The National Board of Trial Advocacy and the National Board of Legal Specialization are approved by the American Bar Association to certify lawyers as specialists in criminal and civil trial practice, worker’s compensation and matrimonial law. Those lawyers go through a rigorous vetting process with extensive trial requirements as well as a grueling written exam. To be re-certified every five years the lawyer must demonstrate continued proficiency and have taken at least 45 hours of continuing education courses in the specialty field.

How many continuing legal education courses has the lawyer screaming to you from the side of a bus taken? Marketing expertise does not win cases in the courtroom. The practice of law should be more than a slogan on a billboard.

Rich Meehan is a nationally certified civil and criminal trial specialist and a Fellow of the International Academy of Trial Lawyers. Rich is the senior partner in the law firm of Meehan, Meehan & Gavin, LLP, Bridgeport, Conn. For more information on Rich or his firm go to www.meehanlaw.com or www.ctdentalmalpracticelawyer.com, or e-mail Rich at rtm@meehanlaw.com

Raise your hand if you have had enough of the Casey Anthony drama! CNN has long been considered as a valid international news source. Its correspondents have brought to our living rooms real time reports of crisis throughout the world. We have watched smart bombs target terror and protests in remote corners of this globe. Each report appears balanced and gives us a sense of the station’s legitimacy. The contrast was particularly striking when you compared CNN to the dueling political “news reports” that emanated from Fox Cable News and MSNBC during the last presidential campaign.

But now CNN has spawned its own version of the supermarket tabloid with HLN, or what I now call the All-Casey-Anthony-All-the-Time-Network. Despite the passage of two weeks since the verdict, HLN continues to foment anger and a lynch mob atmosphere with its relentless replays of the same trial footage, and the sensational opinions of its talking legal bobble heads.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a public trial. The First Amendment guarantees the right of the press to cover and comment on the workings of our court system. Our forefathers wanted to create an open system of the governance of law, as a contrast to the Star Chamber’s secret tribunals that marked the English legal system. The public should hold our judges and prosecutors accountable; but there is something out of balance when biased, opinionated “journalists” can filter our view of a court proceeding to create misconceptions and discord.

What recent picnic or cocktail hour conversation hasn’t included discussion of the Anthony verdict? The horrific death of this child should disgust and revile us. We should be demanding justice for this innocent. But what we should not do is vilify the 12 peope who were charged with the responsibility to sit for weeks and listen to ALL the evidence, not just what Nancy Grace and her ilk want us to hear.

The skewed “news” commentaries have unfairly targeted those jurors. How many of your friends who feel strongly that the legal system failed, watched any amount of the actual courtroom footage? Even if they were tuned in to TruTV or HLN all day, each day of the trial, they still only saw what the producers of those programs choose to share with us.

Maybe this jury did make a mistake. After nearly four decades of trying cases I find that one hard to accept. The idea that twelve different individuals somehow got it all mixed up doesn’t compute for me. Maybe one or two were persuaded by artful lawyering, but all twelve- I can’t accept that. Maybe Ashton and Drane-Burdick failed to persuade, or maybe they simply overreached and didn’t have a solid case. The acquittal is more a reflection of that than a callous disregard for the death of a child.

Casey Anthony was not a sympathetic figure. Her 31 days of partying and lack of concern while shocking doesn’t equate to murder. Defense counsel, Jose Baez, was good, but not that good that he could hornswoggle 12 people.

The Nancy Graces of TV journalism will continue to rant and fuel the public furor as long as it creates ratings for HLN. What this former prosecutor fails to grasp is the chilling effect her rants will have on future juries. How many right thinking people sitting in judgment will hesitate to return the correct verdict for fear of public retribution because the press has chosen to televise a trial. With the advent of more televised trials in this state we must be mindful of this risk. The public has the right to know but we cannot allow TV “lynch mobs” to subvert the sworn obligations of jurors when they enter a courtroom or we will never persuade people that jury duty is an important civic responsibility.

Rich Meehan is a nationally certified civil and criminal trial specialist and a Fellow of the International Academy of Trial Lawyers. Rich is the senior partner in the law firm of Meehan, Meehan & Gavin, LLP, Bridgeport, Conn. For more information on Rich or his firm go to www.meehanlaw.com or www.ctdentalmalpracticelawyer.com, or e-mail Rich at rtm@meehanlaw.com